Patrick Loobuyck: Intrinsic and equal human worth in a secular worldview.
The idea of equal human worth is central in almost all major ethical traditions in history. The bible, Rabbi Hillel, Confusious and the Indian epic the Mahabharata, all accept, in some form or other, a version of the golden rule that encourages equal consideration of interests.[7] Furthermore, the experience of all human beings as sacred and intrinsically valuable is widely shared among religions and is the basis of many systems of religious ethics.[8]
In line with Kant, as well as other modern moral philosophers – and especially for humanists – the idea of equal and intrinsic human worth is a necessary condition for morality. This condition is a central presupposition of the egalitarian liberal stance of Dworkin, Rawls, and Nagel, as well as in Nozick's libertarianism. The Benthamite version of utilitarianism (e.g. of Peter Singer) also uses the equality principle that each is to count as one and none is to count as more than one, in spite of the fact that, in that utilitarianism, people do not have intrinsic value.[9]
Of course, the idea of intrinsic and equal human worth is also the basis of human rights discourse. Every declaration of human rights alludes in one way or another to the concept of ‘the inherent dignity of
JSRI • No.9 Winter 2004 p.59
all human beings'. Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. By now most secular and many religious moral systems, theories, and practices accept that declaration as a legitimate and necessary basis. Human rights discourse is accepted as the lingua franca of international moral and political thought. Human rights are the universal minimum minimorum (a decidedly ‘thin' theory of what is right) for every political and moral practice.[10]
Many secular moralists built upon and refer to the discourse of human rights, because for secularists the idea of human rights has replaced the earlier authority and certainty of religion as the basis for morality. In our time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become the sacred text of what Elie Wiesel has called a ‘world-wide secular religion'.[11] Human rights have become the major secular article of faith (Ignatieff even warns of ‘idolatry') of a culture that fears it believes in nothing else.[12]
As such, the idea of intrinsic and equal human worth is one of the most important basic theses in secular morality. However, as we will see, the idea of intrinsic and equal human value has in fact a natural home in theological metaphysics, and does not easily fit into secular moral philosophy.[13] For human rights are based on two ideas: first, that every human being is ‘sacred'[14] – or in secular terms: each and every human being is ‘inviolable', has ‘inherent dignity and worth', is ‘an end in himself'. Second, because every human being is sacred, certain things ought not to be done to any human being, and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.[15] This is called the moral principle of human rights: human rights are claim-rights and entail correlative moral duties of other persons.[16] In the words of Mackie we could say that human rights entail an ‘objective requirement'.[17] The fact that people have human rights implies a categorical imperative: it express a reason for acting that is unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire, preference, or interest of the agent.
It is very hard to place all this in a secular worldview, because an indifferent universe cannot make room for intrinsic values, the sacredness of human beings, and objectively prescriptive properties. The putative queerness of moral rights lies with the notion of moral bindingness. It seems that many secular moralists presuppose theses that they cannot really justify. The ideas of human dignity, worth, and sacredness appear to confuse what is with what ought to be. They are controversial because each version of them must make metaphysical claims about human nature and objective requirements beyond what we can know empirically.[18]
3. The project of naturalistic accommodation
In line with Kant, as well as other modern moral philosophers – and especially for humanists – the idea of equal and intrinsic human worth is a necessary condition for morality. This condition is a central presupposition of the egalitarian liberal stance of Dworkin, Rawls, and Nagel, as well as in Nozick's libertarianism. The Benthamite version of utilitarianism (e.g. of Peter Singer) also uses the equality principle that each is to count as one and none is to count as more than one, in spite of the fact that, in that utilitarianism, people do not have intrinsic value.[9]
Of course, the idea of intrinsic and equal human worth is also the basis of human rights discourse. Every declaration of human rights alludes in one way or another to the concept of ‘the inherent dignity of
JSRI • No.9 Winter 2004 p.59
all human beings'. Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. By now most secular and many religious moral systems, theories, and practices accept that declaration as a legitimate and necessary basis. Human rights discourse is accepted as the lingua franca of international moral and political thought. Human rights are the universal minimum minimorum (a decidedly ‘thin' theory of what is right) for every political and moral practice.[10]
Many secular moralists built upon and refer to the discourse of human rights, because for secularists the idea of human rights has replaced the earlier authority and certainty of religion as the basis for morality. In our time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become the sacred text of what Elie Wiesel has called a ‘world-wide secular religion'.[11] Human rights have become the major secular article of faith (Ignatieff even warns of ‘idolatry') of a culture that fears it believes in nothing else.[12]
As such, the idea of intrinsic and equal human worth is one of the most important basic theses in secular morality. However, as we will see, the idea of intrinsic and equal human value has in fact a natural home in theological metaphysics, and does not easily fit into secular moral philosophy.[13] For human rights are based on two ideas: first, that every human being is ‘sacred'[14] – or in secular terms: each and every human being is ‘inviolable', has ‘inherent dignity and worth', is ‘an end in himself'. Second, because every human being is sacred, certain things ought not to be done to any human being, and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.[15] This is called the moral principle of human rights: human rights are claim-rights and entail correlative moral duties of other persons.[16] In the words of Mackie we could say that human rights entail an ‘objective requirement'.[17] The fact that people have human rights implies a categorical imperative: it express a reason for acting that is unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire, preference, or interest of the agent.
It is very hard to place all this in a secular worldview, because an indifferent universe cannot make room for intrinsic values, the sacredness of human beings, and objectively prescriptive properties. The putative queerness of moral rights lies with the notion of moral bindingness. It seems that many secular moralists presuppose theses that they cannot really justify. The ideas of human dignity, worth, and sacredness appear to confuse what is with what ought to be. They are controversial because each version of them must make metaphysical claims about human nature and objective requirements beyond what we can know empirically.[18]
3. The project of naturalistic accommodation
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