Balu: Cultural Dynamics article

from The future of the Present: Thinking through Orientalism

Orientalism has been characterized as a particular way of thinking. The particularity of this thinking lies not merely in the fact that understaning other cultures takes place in terms of Western culture. It is also exhibited in the way other cultures are transformed into pale imitations of the West. Let us recollect Said again: ‘[T]he Orient and the Oriental, Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese, or whatever, become repetitious pseudo-incarnations of some great original (Christ, Europe, the West) they were supposed to have been imitating’ (p.62). Being the ‘constraints upon and limitations of thought’, social sciences generate Orientalism when the West looks at other cultures. Looked at in isolation from Orientalism, social sciences are how the West experiences itself. Social sciences teach us about Western culture.

However, ‘social sciences’ are many: not just in terms of domains or fields of study, but also in terms of domain-theories. How can they be read as expressions of a particular type of culture? Are the changing theories, their assumptions, etc., symptomatic of the changing nature of the Western culture? Alternatively, is there also an underlying continuity (the famous ‘essence’) to these changes? For instance, there are as many notions and theories of ‘religion’ and ‘ethics’ as one could think of. From among them, which notion or theory about either of the two phenomena ‘expresses Western culture’? How could one justify the selection at all without a prior theory of the Western culture?

These are legitimate problems, to be sure. It is, however, of great importance to note that they have arisen in the context of looking at social sciences independent of Orientalism. In fact, these problems parallel those with respect to Orientalist discourse about ‘other cultures’. What we need to do, therefore is to look at the one as providing answers to the other. In rather abstract terms, it means that Orientalism answers questions about social sciences. The former constrains the latter to ask particular kinds of questions; these, in turn, tell us about the kind of culture that asks these and not other questions.

Even at this general level, if this claim is true, we can begin to appreciate the signal achievement of Said’s Orientalism. He has provided us with the ‘Archimedean point’ to move the world. It can now be shown why a critique of Orientalism is required. Such a critique does not help us to ascertain our ‘dignity’ or recover our pride, or saddle the current and future generations in the West with guilt complexes. In a true and fundamental sense, it enables us to contribute to the growth of human knowledge. For that is what we will surely be doing when, through a critique of Orientalism, we undertake to understand one particular culture’s way of understanding itself. Such a task will force us to provide alternate descriptions of the world that are richer and fuller than those we have today. If this is not a quest for knowledge, what is?

the culture of the self FOUCAULT

http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/audiofiles.html#foucault

Rose Galvin: 'The Paradox of Disability Culture'

...we are still tightly bound to
a notion of identity which supports our need for fixity and unity. These conflicting
perceptions, and, thus, the paradox that emerges from them, result in a case of
double vision when trying to articulate the state of the late modern subject. The
simultaneous view of the subject as both stable, and constantly shifting, unified and
fragmented, fixed and fluid, singular and hybrid, creates a sense of what Caines
(2003) refers to as ‘vertigo’ in the face of these incommensurable realities. This
dizziness and lack of orientation is also transferred to the ways in which we perceive
collective identity and, as is the common tendency when we feel threatened with a
loss of balance, we reach blindly for anything solid and grip as tightly to it as
possible. I believe that this desire to cling onto what seems safe and comprehensible
is at the root of our current dilemma within the realm of identity politics, for,
although there are a multitude of theorists who are arguing passionately for the
recognition of difference and diversity within liberatory movements, they remain
loathe to let go of their liberal philosophical understanding of identity as being
synonymous with unity and continuity. ...


...I believe that, although biological and humanist essentialism are based on different
kinds of originary logic, they are both implicated in the same modernist stalemate,
which comes from seeking liberation by simply reversing the dichotomies which
define who is privileged and who is excluded in our society. By claiming an identity
which has been created through the processes of hierarchical differentiation and
exclusion, subjugated peoples reinforce their own oppression and restrict their hopes
to the belief that they can demonstrate how positive it is to be identified as such.
This kind of thinking misses the point entirely. What we must do is to challenge the
very frameworks within which this way of perceiving the world as ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ have been constructed. The question
should not be focused on whether we have positive characteristics based on our
disability, womanhood or racial origins, but on how these distinctions function in
the first place and what, if anything, lies outside of them.

judy butler in Gender Trouble

Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject
an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such
a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims?…If a stable notion of
gender no longer proves to be the foundational premise of feminist politics,
perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to contest the very
reification of gender and identity…[and] to formulate within this constituted
frame a critique of the categories of identity that contemporary
juridical structures engender, naturalise, and immobilise. (p. 5)

from a review of Partha Chatterjee's book Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World

“The Cunning of Reason” is a short (anti-)Hegelian coda and conclusion to the book. Where Hegel had found a promise of salvation upon what he grimly described as “the slaughter-bench of history” (thanks to “the cunning of Reason”), Chatterjee see Reason as “sovereign, tyrannical universality,” which “in its universalizing mission has been parasitic upon a much less lofty, much more mundane, palpably material and singularly invidious force, namely the universalist urge of capital” (168). Reason and capital, according to Chatterjee, have fused into the juggernaut of “development,” and nowhere has nationalism as such been able to halt this giant’s march through the world.

james ferguson

from The Anti-Politics Machine

Like "civilization" in the nineteenth century, "development" is the name not only for a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within this interpretive grid, a host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible and meaningful. Poor countries are by definition "less developed", and the poverty and powerlessness of the people who live in such countries are only the external signs of this underlying condition. The images of the ragged poor of Asia thus become legible as markers of a stage of development, while the bloated bellies of African children are the signs of social as well as nutritional deficiency. Within this problematic, it appears self-evident that debtor Third World nation-states and starving peasants share a common "problem", that both lack a single "thing": "development".

john locke

AN ESSAY CONCERNINGTHE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND ENDOF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (an excerpt)
59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of Nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compass of that law? I answer, an estate wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, somebody else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? what made him free of that law- that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions, according to his own will, within the permission of that law? a capacity of knowing that law. Which is supposed, by that law, at the age of twenty-one, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then, we see the law allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die and fail to substitute a deputy in this trust, if he hath not provided a tutor to govern his son during his minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes care to do it: some other must govern him and be a will to him till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will. But after that the father and son are equally free, as much as tutor and pupil, after nonage, equally subjects of the same law together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of Nature, or under the positive laws of an established government.
60. But if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of Nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will; because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide, but is continued under the tuition and government of others all the time his own understanding is incapable of that charge. And so lunatics and idiots are never set free from the government of their parents: "Children who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have, and innocents, which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having." Thirdly: "Madmen, which, for the present, cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have, for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for them," says Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i., s. 7). All which seems no more than that duty which God and Nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents' regal authority.
61. Thus we are born free as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by his father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of it, are so consistent and so distinguishable that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, "by right of fatherhood," cannot miss of it; the most obstinate cannot but allow of it. For were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and, by that title, settled a monarch in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of, if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of others and not his own; and yet will any one think that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of, that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If anybody should ask me when my son is of age to be free, I shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. "But at what time," says the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i., s. 6), "a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern than for any one, by skill and learning, to determine."
62. Commonwealths themselves take notice of, and allow that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore, till that time, require not oaths of fealty or allegiance, or other public owning of, or submission to, the government of their countries.

i, pierre riviere...

...having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother.

ingstad

Document The myth of disability in developing nations
The Lancet; London; Aug 28, 1999; Benedicte Ingstad;
Volume: 354
Issue: 9180
Start Page: 757-758
ISSN: 01406736
Subject Terms: Handicapped people
Culture
Research
Society
Abstract:
Research is being obtained that shows that in many cultures physical or mental
impairment is not necessarily what determines the status and inclusion of a
person in society.
Full Text:
Copyright Lancet Ltd. Aug 28, 1999
"You must know that in this country people hide their disabled family members at
the lands". These words were said to me by the person responsible for a Ministry
of Health rehabilitation programme in a country in Southern Africa. The
conversation took place as I introduced my interest in studying how families in
a developing country cope with care for a disabled family member. As it
happened, the lady did not succeed in convincing me, but only sharpened my
interest in looking behind what I have later come to call "the myth of the
hidden disabled".1
The first question that comes to mind with a statement like this is: Is it
really true? In European history and fairytales there are stories about people
with disability that was hidden, neglected, and abused. There are also current
cases of abuse of disabled people, but we do not use these to create a general
picture of behaviour in Europe or the USA. Such cases are judged to be
unfortunate exceptions. From developing nations come stories about hiding,
neglect, and even murder of infants with an obvious impairment. However, these
cases are not seen as exceptions or past history, but are presented in documents
from authoritative sources like WHO2 as a general and current problem in these
countries. They are seen as "attitudes" resulting from "beliefs".
Fortunately, we are beginning to obtain research that presents a different
picture. We have learned that in many cultures physical or mental impairment is
not necessarily what determines the status and inclusion of a person in society.
More important are family and kinship ties, competence in doing useful tasks for
the good of the household, and the ability to behave in a socially accepted
manner. Beliefs about the origin of disability do play a part, but more so in
the search for therapy than in determining the acceptance of the disabled person
into society.3-5 We have also learned that when families are unable to cope with
the care of a disabled relative it is more commonly a result of poverty, lack of
support, and lack of knowledge about what can be done to improve the situation
than a result of lack of love and negative attitudes.1
Thus the second question to ask is: How can such a myth prevail despite
contradicting evidence? An impairment stands out as a visible symbol of
misfortune, one that reflects not only on the individual but also on the close
family. This is especially true in cultures in which reasons for misfortune are
explained in terms of disturbed social relationships. This myth stands in
contrast to another myth that is commonly upheld; the myth that elderly people
in developing countries are well cared for by their families.6 Ageing, however,
is a natural event, whereas an impairment is thought of as something not wished
for or planned for, and is therefore stigmatising.7
When a public officer gives a statement like the one above, she forgets the fact
that most rural families in her country spend a large part of the year in rural,
agricultural areas. She also does not take into consideration that it is common
for many elderly people and children not attending school to remain there for
most of the year. In such rural areas milk is abundant, and people can pick
roots and berries just outside the family compound instead of having to share
scarce food rations with family members in the village. And nobody would say
that an elderly grandmother or a healthy 4-year-old is "hidden". The lady from
the ministry, who is trained in "modern ways" by well-meaning "experts" from
abroad, tends to forget her own cultural knowledge and sees what she is made to
believe is there. She is also required to adopt the explanations of donors to
justify the implementation of a new project and the subsequent allocations to be
made from the government budget.
This does not mean that rehabilitation programmes are not needed-they clearly
are. But while in the 1980s there was a tendency to implement ready-made models
such as the WHO or International Labour Organisation community-based
rehabilitation programmes in developing countries, today there is more awareness
about the need for such programmes to be adapted to the particular circumstances
of the community.
In that sense, it is important to consider "the myth of the hidden disabled".
The repercussion of planning services based on such false myths could easily be
that the needs of the target groups are missed-whether this means people with a
disability, elderly people, or others. Thus, the chances of compliance and
success of the project are also reduced. In recent years, however, many people
with a disability in developing nations have become more vocal and able to speak
for themselves before the authorities. This is a positive trend that will become
even stronger in the future. We should not forget, however, that these
spokespeople are usually an elite as far as education and ambitions are
concerned, and do not necessarily represent the needs of poor people with
disabilities living in rural areas of developing countries. The voices of the
latter group must also be heard.
[Reference]
References
[Reference]
1 Ingstad B. Community-based rehabilitation in Botswana: the myth of the hidden
disabled. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
2 Helander E. Rehabilitation for all: a guide to the management of
community-based rehabilitation, 1: policymaling and planning. Geneva: WHO, 1984.
3 Ingstad B, Whyte SR. Disability and culture. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1995.
4 Whyte SR. Questioning misfortune. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
5 Whyte SR. Slow cookers and madmen: competence of heart and head in rural
Uganda. In: Jenkins R, ed. Questions of competence: culture, classification and
intellectual disability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
6 Ingstad B, Bruun FJJ, Sandberg E, Tlou S. Care for the elderly--care by the
elderly: the role of elderly women in changing Tswana society. J Cross-Cultural
Gerontol 1992; 7: 379-98.
7 Jenkins R. Questions of competence: culture, classification and intellectual
disability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[Author note]
Department of General Practice and Community Medicine, Section for Medical
Anthropology, University of Oslo, Norway
(B Ingstad PhD)
(e-mail: benedicte.ingstad@samfunnsmed.uio.no)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or
distribution is prohibited without permission.

karl marx: On the Jewish Question

If we find that even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state. Since, however, the existence of religion is the existence of defect, the source of this defect can only be sought in the nature of the state itself. We no longer regard religion as the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore, we explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular restrictions. We do not turn secular questions into theological ones. History has long enough been merged in superstition, we now merge superstition in history. The question of the relation of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation. We criticize the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form, apart from its weaknesses as regards religion. The contradiction between the state and a particular religion, for instance Judaism, is given by us a human form as the contradiction between the state and particular secular elements; the contradiction between the state and religion in general as the contradiction between the state and its presuppositions in general.
The political emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, and, in general, of religious man, is the emancipation of the state from Judaism, from Christianity, from religion in general. In its own form, in the manner characteristic of its nature, the state as a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion – that is to say, by the state as a state not professing any religion, but, on the contrary, asserting itself as a state. The political emancipation from religion is not a religious emancipation that has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction, because political emancipation is not a form of human emancipation which has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction.
The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the state can be a free state [pun on word Freistaat, which also means republic] without man being a free man.

dreaming a dissertation and other dreams

the name of this space is drawn from my advisor's book title. i will be using this space to post things i will need to taste, consume and/ or spit out for the sake of a dissertation that hopes to be in the making in time.
so here goes and hope i break a leg, at the risk of ironic metaphors in the light of disability studies.